Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
Uncertain Systems Lab, School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
Abstract
Coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperations among players, and there are different solution concepts such as the core,
the Shapley value and the kernel. In many situations, there is no way to predict the payoff functions except for the expert experiences
and subjective intuitions, which leads to the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Within the framework of credibility theory, this paper employs
two credibilistic approaches to define the behaviors of players under fuzzy situations. Correspondingly, two variations of Shapley value are
proposed as the solutions of the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Meanwhile, some characterizations of the credibilistic Shapley value
are investigated. Finally, an example is provided for illustrating the usefulness of the theory developed in this paper.
Keywords
for cooperative games}, Advances in Game Theory, Annals of
Mathematics Studies, {\bf 52} (1964), 443-476.
Princeton, 1974.
Research, {\bf 6} (1981), 1-13.
concept}, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, {\bf 1} (1978), 181-192.
matrix games in a direct way}, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, {\bf 49} (1992), 193-203.
Plenum, New York, 1988.
algorithm}, Computer \& Mathmatics with applications, {\bf 49} (2005), 1539-1548.
information}, Journal of Uncertain Systems, {\bf 1(1)} (2007), 72-78.
\bibitem{Gao111} J. Gao, {\it Fuzzy dependent-chance multilevel programming with applications}, Journal of Universal Computer Science, to be Published.
\bibitem{Gao112} J. Gao and Y. Yu, {\it Credibilistic extensive game with fuzzy information}, Soft Computing, to be Published.
The American Economic Review, {\bf 85(3)} (1995), 291-303.
\bibitem{Gao101} R. Liang, Y. Yu, J. Gao and Z. Q. Liu, {\it N-person credibilistic strategic game}, Frontiers of Computer Science in China, {\bf 4(2)} (2010), 212-219.
\bibitem{Liu02} B.~Liu and Y.~Liu, {\it Expected value of fuzzy variable and fuzzy
expected value models}, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, {\bf 10} (2002), 445-450.
fuzzy expected value models}, International Journal of
Uncertainty, Fuzziness \& Knowledge-Based Systems, {\bf 11(2)} (2003), 195-215.
foundations}, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2004.
{\bf 5(4)} (2006), 387-408.
to fuzzy random optimization}, International Journal of
Uncertainty, Fuzziness \& Knowledge-Based Systems, {\bf 15} (2007), 1-20.
New York: Wiley, 1944.
game with fuzzy payoff}, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and
Applications, {\bf 251} (2000), 885-896.
zero-sum game with fuzzy payoff}, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, {\bf 139} (2003), 283-296.
and Systems, {\bf 114(1)} (2000), 23-33.
properties of the kernel, nucleolus and related solution concepts},
Mathematics Operational Research, {\bf 4} (1979), 303-337.
and fuzzy goals}, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, {\bf 111(1)} (2000), 99-116.
arising from linear production programming problems with fuzzy
parameters}, Fuzzy sets and Systems, {\bf 114(1)} (2000), 11-21.
\bibitem{Nishizaki00b} I. Nishiizaki and M. Sakawa, {\it Solutions based
on fuzzy goals in fuzzy linear programming games}, Fuzzy Sets
and Systems, {\bf 115(1)} (2000), 105-109.
the distribution of power in committee systerm}, American
Politics Science Review, {\bf 48} (1954), 787-792.
characteristic function games}, Journal of Applied Mathematics
{\bf 17} (1969), 1163-1170.
%game}, Kluswer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2003.
possibility}, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, {\bf 1}(1978), 3-28.\vspace{-.3 cm}