Fuzzy transferable-utility games: a weighted allocation and related results

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Applied Mathematics, National Pingtung University, Pingtung 900, Taiwan

2 Ling-Yun Chung (corresponding author), Graduate School of Technological and Vocational Education, National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Yunlin 64002, Taiwan

Abstract

By considering the supreme-utilities among fuzzy sets and the weights among participants simultaneously, we introduce the supreme-weighted value on fuzzy transferable-utility games. Further, we provide some equivalent relations to characterize the family of all solutions that admit a potential on weights. We also propose the dividend approach to provide alternative viewpoint for the potential approach. Based on these equivalent relations, several axiomatic results are also proposed to present the rationality for the supreme-weighted value.

Keywords

References

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Iranian Journal of Fuzzy Systems
Volume 16, Issue 3
May and June 2019
Pages 189-197

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